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Abstract
Since the 1960s, trade opportunities based on complementary economies have driven
the Australia-Korea economic relationship. Australia exported raw materials,
principally minerals and energy, which Korea processed and subsequently sold on
domestic and international markets. In return, Australia purchased increasing
volumes of Korean manufactures, initially textiles, clothing and footwear and later
automobiles. With the onset of the financial and economic crisis in Korea during
1997-98, trade and investment opportunities were severely constrained. However, in
the wake of the crisis, and the rapid recovery of the Korean economy underpinned by
corporate and financial sector reforms, trade and investment opportunities in
traditional areas have re-emerged as well as in new areas. Australia’s rapid
economic growth has also increased demand for the sorts of consumer products
produced by Korea. It is, therefore, opportune to consider the benefits, and obstacles,
to the establishment of an Australia-Korea Free Trade Agreement.
The paper analyses trends in Australia’s trade and investment with Korea. New areas
for trade are also highlighted as well as prospects for an FTA between the two
countries. In doing so it: reviews the Australia-Korea bilateral trade relationship;
reviews the nature and extent of foreign direct investment between Australia and
Korea; reviews trade and investment prospects and opportunities between the two
countries; analyses the prospects for a Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement
(KAFTA); reviews the potential economic effects from a KAFTA; and identifies key
policy implications.

1.

Introduction

Since the 1960s trade opportunities based on complementary economies, arising
primarily from differences in resource endowments, has provided the basis for the
pattern and growth of Australia-Korea bilateral trade. Australia exported agricultural
products and raw materials, principally minerals and energy, which Korea processed
and sold on domestic and international markets. In return, Australia purchased
increasing volumes of Korean manufactures, initially textiles, clothing and footwear
and later automobiles, electrical equipment, telecommunications equipment and office
machines. The expansion in bilateral trade between the two countries was most
apparent from the mid 1970s. Total bilateral trade increased from only A$ 16.6 million
in 1965-66 to A$176 million in 1975 and to A$13.8 billion in 2000. Growth over the
period 1975 to 2000 equated to an annual growth rate of 19.1 per cent (Kwon
(2001b)).
This rapid growth in bilateral trade can be linked to two important developments in
Korea. First, the diversification of resource imports arising from the oil crisis of 1973,
and, second, the heavy and chemical industries drive during the period of the 1970s
(Kwon (2001b)). By 1994, Korea had overtaken the US as Australia’s second largest
export market after Japan.
Although the financial and economic crisis of 1997-98 resulted in a decline in
Australian exports to Korea, by 7 per cent in 1997 and 10 per cent in 1998, imports
from Korea remained strong and growing by 28 per cent and 41 per cent in 1997 and
1998 respectively. In 1998 Korea was still Australia’s third largest export market and
fourth largest trading partner. In the same year Australia was Korea’s fourth largest
import source and fifth largest trading partner (Australian Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (1999b)).
During the period of Korea’s financial and economic crisis the Australian government
focused upon maintaining trade flows, in particular by expanding export credit
facilities when commercial suppliers withdrew. This contributed to an expansion in
Australia’s share of the Korean import market from 3.7 per cent in 1990 to just under
5 per cent in 1998, when Korea’s demand for imported manufactured goods declined
faster than its demand for raw materials and essential foodstuffs (Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999b). In the wake of the financial crisis
economic reforms and market liberalisation in Korea have presented new trade
opportunities, particularly in manufacturing and services due to corporate and
financial restructuring (Harvie and Lee (2003), Harvie, Lee and Oh (2004), Kwon
(2001a)). More contentiously the Australian government has also been pressing for
greater market access for agricultural products (Australian Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (1999b).
Over the longer term, however, internal and external pressures are pushing both these
economies to focus upon knowledge and skill intensive economic activities as the
basis of their comparative advantages, and this is likely to have profound implications
for the existing structure of bilateral trade which is currently based on complementary
economies (Kwon (2001b)). Australia and Korea will wish to focus more upon
1
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knowledge intensive exports. This will require Australia to diversify its economic
relationship with Korea and to demonstrate its capability as an advanced economic
society with cutting edge technological capacity capable of meeting the needs of
Korea. As Korea moves from heavy goods manufacturing to knowledge intensive
activities it will require less imports of raw materials from Australia (Kwon (2001b)).
In this context the paper analyses trends in Australia’s trade and investment with
Korea. New areas for trade are also highlighted as well as prospects for an FTA
between the two countries. In doing so it proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the
Australia-Korea bilateral trade relationship. Section 3 reviews the nature and extent of
foreign direct investment between Australia and Korea. Section 4 reviews trade and
investment prospects and opportunities between the two countries. Section 5 analyses
the prospects for a Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA). Section 6
reviews the potential economic effects from a KAFTA. Finally, in section 7, a
summary of the major points from this paper is presented as well as policy
implications.

2.

Australia-Korea bilateral trade

In 1994, Korea overtook the US as Australia’s second largest export market. While
this ranking slipped during the economic crisis of 1997-98, Korea still remained
Australia’s third largest export market after Japan and the US, and fourth largest
trading partner. Bilateral trade grew from A$6.6 million in 1965-66 to A$10.3 billion
in 1998 (see Table 1). Over the past 30 years, Australia’s exports to Korea have
grown at an annual average rate of around 25 per cent per year, one of the fastest
growth rates recorded amongst Australia’s top 16 export markets (Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999b). Imports from Korea have also
grown strongly, although the trade balance, both merchandise and services, remains in
Australia’s favour (see Figure 1 and Tables 2 and 3).
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Table 1 Australia’s Trade with Korea 1993-98, A$ million
Trade A$
million
Exports
Exports
minus gold
Imports
Imports
minus gold
Balance
of
trade
Balance
of
trade minus
gold
Growth rate
(%)
Exports
Export
growth
excluding
gold
Imports
Import
growth
excluding
gold

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

4,359
3,893

4,709
3,974

6,062
4,612

7,305
4,423

6,761
4,910

6,099
4,841

1,866
1,866

1,766
1,766

2,257
2,255

2,325
2,323

2,966
2,806

4,175
3,038

2,494

2,941

3,805

4,980

3,794

1,924

2,028

2,208

2,357

2,100

2,104

1,803

19.1
17.9

8.0
2.1

28.8
16.1

20.5
-4.1

-7.4
11.0

-9.8
-1.4

22.8
22.8

-5.3
-5.3

27.8
27.7

3.0
3.0

27.6
20.8

40.8
8.3

Source: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Australian exports to Korea
Throughout the 1990s Australia’s exports to Korea grew steadily, but dropped in 1997
with the onset of the financial crisis and then dropped sharply again in early 1998 as
Korea entered into a severe economic recession. However, Australia’s exports of
essential raw materials and basic foodstuffs suffered less than most other countries’
exports. In US dollar terms total Korean imports fell 35 per cent in 1998, while
Australia’s Korean exports were down 22 per cent. Around 75 per cent of this fall was
due to declining gold prices. Excluding the gold trade Australia’s exports fell only 14
per cent in terms of US dollars, a good performance given the size of Korea’s import
contraction. The smaller drop in 1998 bilateral trade relative to other suppliers
highlighted the strong complementarities of the two economies, implying demand for
Australian exports, particularly raw materials and intermediate inputs, would remain
strong over the medium to long terms (Kwon (1998)).

3

Figure 1

Source: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Table 2 Australian merchandise trade with Korea, 2003

Exports to Korea (A$ million)
Imports from Korea (A$ million)
Total trade (exports + imports) (A$
million)
Merchandise trade surplus with Korea
(A$ million)

Total
share
(%)
8,084 7.5
4,737 3.6
12,821 5.4

Rank

Growth
(yoy)

5th
7th
6th

-19.0%
-0.6%
-13.1%

3,347

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics
Table 3 Australian trade in services with Korea, 2003

Exports of services to Korea (A$
million)
Imports of services from Korea (A$
million)
Services trade surplus with Korea
(A$ million)

Total
share
870 2.7%
432 1.3%
438

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics
Table 4 indicates that Australia’s major export items to Korea are coal, crude
petroleum, non-monetary gold, iron ore and aluminium. The further inclusion of
wool, wood, zinc ore, steel, wheat, sugar and beef account for 75 per cent of
Australia’s exports to Korea. Hence commodities dominate Australia’s exports to
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Korea, the demand for which are strongly influenced by the performance of the
Korean economy and global commodity prices. Coal is the most dominant single
item, contributing around 13 per cent of merchandise exports, then crude petroleum
(11 per cent), non monetary gold (10 per cent), iron ore (9 per cent) and aluminium (6
per cent). These five items alone contributed around 50 per cent of merchandise
exports. The export of food and live animals accounted for only around 7 per cent of
total merchandise exports, while the export of manufactured goods contributed only
16 per cent.
Commodities
In the late 1990s Australia provided around 50 per cent of Korea’s coking and thermal
coal requirements, due to its superior quality to that from China and lower transport
costs to that from the more distant USA, Canada, South Africa and South America.
The demand for coal from Australia is closely linked to the performance of the
Korean economy and in particular the production of steel and electricity. Future
demand for Australian coal will be influenced by Korea’s decision regarding the
diversification of supply. Demand for iron ore will also be influenced by the future
performance of the economy, particularly in relation to steel production. By the late
1990s, Australia’s market share for iron ore in Korea was around 47 per cent.
Maintaining this share during the period of economic recovery in Korea presented
significant opportunities for expanded iron ore exports. Australia is also an important
supplier of non-ferrous metals to Korea, principally zinc and copper. Zinc and copper
are used extensively in the construction and automobiles sectors; thus Korean imports
of these metals are tied closely to the expected growth rates for these sectors. With the
recovery of the Korean economy the construction and fabrication sector experienced
stronger growth particularly in infrastructure and housing.

Table 4 Major Australian exports to Korea, 2003 (A$ million)
Coal
Crude petroleum
Non-monetary gold
Iron ore
Aluminium

1,074
919
797
729
506

Source: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

While demand for raw materials and intermediate inputs should remain strong over
the medium to long term, the Korean market for commodities is likely to become
increasingly competitive as foreign investment and privatisation reforms increase the
competitiveness of Korean industry; Australia will not be able to take the market for
granted.
While Koreans remain sensitive about agricultural food imports the market is opening
slowly to foreign competition, and imports comprise over 40 per cent of total food
consumed. Australia is a major supplier of meat, grains, sugar, dairy products and
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wool. Australia’s share of this market fell after 1996 mainly driven by falling beef
exports. This was due to falling demand in the wake of the financial crisis. However,
under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Korea agreed to liberalise its beef market,
moving from a quota system to a tariff only regime by 2001. Prospects remain good
for Australian beef over the medium to long term when full liberalisation takes place.
But agriculture and farm production remains a sensitive issue as discussed in more
detail below2.
During the 1970s and 1980s Korea developed a substantial wool textile sector, with
Australia supplying 50 to 60 per cent of Korea’s wool requirements. However, in the
1990s extensive restructuring of the Korean wool textile industry saw production
move offshore as demand in the US and Japanese markets weakened and high labour
costs reduced the viability of domestic production. Since 1995, Australia’s wool
exports to Korea have declined steadily. Bankruptcies and excessive wool stocks
threaten the Korean industry and the market has remained depressed.
Korea is also an important export market for sugar and wheat. Australia’s share of
Korea’s sugar market has increased to over 50 per cent. Wheat exports have remained
volatile, reflecting drought induced supply problems in Australia more than market
access problems. By the late 1990s Australia supplied around 20 per cent of Korea’s
total wheat import market.
Manufactures
Australia’s manufactured exports to Korea, valued at around A$1.5 billion in 2003,
comprises both simply transformed manufactures, notably aluminium, and elaborately
transformed manufactures, dominated by car engines. The economic crisis of 1998
severely impacted upon Korea’s imports of aluminium, although imports from
Australia were less severely affected and consequently increased market share. With
economic recovery and subsequent public works spending on infrastructures, demand
for aluminium recovered. Demand for Australian exports of aluminium was also
affected because of reform of the corporate sector in Korea. In the medium term, as
excess manufacturing capacity is overcome, housing spending recovers, and the
construction sector has recovered its growth, aluminium demand will also increase.
Over the longer term the prospects for Australian aluminium will depend upon it
meeting the challenge of increased competition, particularly from Russia and South
Africa.
Before the economic crisis in Korea, Australia’s share of elaborately transformed
manufactured imports grew 20 per cent per year from a relatively low base, reaching
A$825 million in 1997. Car engines and parts grew strongest. However, with the
onset of the crisis in Korea engine exports halved to just A$157 million as the Korean
domestic market for medium sized cars shrunk and export markets remained weak.
Rationalisation of the Korean car industry under the government’s ‘Big Deal’ top five
chaebol subsidiary swaps policy, and the improved relative competitiveness of
domestically made parts through won depreciation have made short to medium term
prospects uncertain.

2
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Services
Korea is an important market for Australian service exports, particularly educational
and tourism services, but Korea’s economic crisis seriously affected both (Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2003). In 1997-98 Australian service
exports to Korea were valued at $702 million, a 36 per cent drop on service exports of
A$1,098 million in 1996-97. Service imports from Australia were principally freight
and shipping.
In 1997, Australia was the third major destination for Koreans studying abroad after
the USA and Japan, and Korea was the largest source of overseas students studying in
Australia. Almost 20,000 students undertook some form of study at Australian
institutions, with some 12,000 attending English language courses. In 1997, Korean
students paid approximately A$350 million to Australian educational suppliers and
probably a similar amount to live in Australia. In 1998, however, the economic crisis
reduced students applying for visas by nearly 30 per cent (Australian Department of
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998)) and the total number of Korean
students studying in Australia fell by nearly 40 per cent in 1998. The market has
recovered, particularly at the postgraduate level, as Koreans value education, and,
until recently, a depreciation of the Australian dollar maintained Australia’s
competitiveness. Australia will need to maintain its reputation in Korea as a provider
of high quality education and, if necessary, adjust programs to retain market share to
meet the opportunities from the recovering market.
Until 1998, Korea was Australia’s sixth largest source of in-bound tourists and
Australia’s fastest growing tourism market. In 1997, 233,000 Korean tourists visited
Australia, a remarkable increase from the 9,000 visitors in 1990. However, in 1998,
arrivals from Korea fell by a massive 72 per cent, to just 66,000. The Australian
Tourism Forecasting Council expected arrivals from Korea to recover over the
medium to longer term, with visitor numbers returning to their 1997 peak by 2006
(Australian Tourism Forecasting Council, 1998). By 2003 tourist figures had returned
to around 207,300.
Australian imports from Korea
Korea is, currently, Australia’s seventh largest source of imports (after the USA,
Japan, China, Germany, UK and New Zealand). Until 1998 manufactures comprised
80 to 90 per cent of Australia’s Korean imports, falling to 65 per cent in the crisis year
of 1998. By 2003, 74 per cent of merchandise imports were manufactured goods,
chemicals 5 per cent, gold 18 per cent and non manufactures 3 per cent. Cars,
computers, telecommunications equipment, household electrical and electronic
appliances remain the most important Korean exports to Australia (see Table 5).
Korea is now second only to Japan as an exporter of passenger vehicles to Australia.
This illustrates the potential for market penetration of high quality and competitively
priced Korean manufactures. Imports of textiles, clothing and footwear have lost
market share to other suppliers, principally China, although they still comprised
around 6 per cent of Korean exports to Australia.
From a Korean perspective, Australia remains an important trading partner. It
represents the country’s eleventh principal export destination and sixth most
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important source of imports (see Tables 6 and 7). Given the obvious
complementarities between them, both in terms of their economic and trading
structures, there are good prospects for an expansion of inter-industry trade.
Table 5 Major Australian imports from Korea, 2003 (A$ million)
Telecommunications equipment
Passenger motor vehicles
Televisions
Computers
Non-monetary gold

965
502
298
264
197

Source: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

3.

Foreign direct investment between Australia and Korea

Australia-Korea bilateral investment flows have not matched the level of trade
(Bishop (2001)). By the late 1990s Korea was only Australia’s eighteenth largest
overseas investment destination and Korean companies were the sixteenth largest
investor in Australia. Australia gives high priority to encouraging increased Korean
investment in Australia, particularly in manufacturing, tourism and resources. This
policy produced some results, with direct and portfolio investment increasing to
around A$1.5 billion before the financial and economic crisis of 1997-98. The bulk of
this was portfolio investment, rather than longer term FDI.
Australian FDI in Korea
Australia’s cumulative FDI in Korea is small. Korean data suggest that by the end of
the 1990s Australian cumulative investment stood at US$38 million, while Australian
data suggested that the figure was A$94 million. Such investment is principally in the
manufacturing and service sectors, although the transport, chemicals and electrical
and electronics sectors have also been recipients. Australian FDI into the Korean
service sector has diversified with consulting, market research, travel agencies and
advertising growing in recent years. In the past, Korean emigrants to Australia also
undertook some hotel and trading company investments. Australia’s Korean FDI
increased with the opening of the service sector, particularly financial services, in the
wake of the financial crisis. Investments in consulting and market research have also
continued to grow as the Korean market recovered from the crisis.
Table 6 Korea’s principal export destinations, % of total exports 2003
1
2
3
4
5
11

China
United States
Japan
Hong Kong
Taiwan
Australia

18.1%
17.7%
8.9%
7.6%
3.6%
1.7%

Source: IMF
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Table 7 Korea’s principal import sources, % of total imports 2003
1
2
3
4
5
6

Japan
United States
China
Saudi Arabia
Germany
Australia

20.3%
13.9%
12.3%
5.2%
3.8%
3.3%

Source: IMF
A survey conducted by Lee (1998) using 24 Australian and other foreign companies
operating in Korea suggested that most of those surveyed were satisfied with their
investment. Of managers surveyed, 75 per cent indicated that their companies were
either very or reasonably satisfied with profitability, while 25 per cent were
disappointed. The major factors leading these companies to initially invest in Korea
were its large domestic market and expected economic growth in new markets (see
Table 8). Another important motive for investing in Korea was to develop a local
presence as part of the company’s overall globalisation strategy.
Two thirds of surveyed companies considered the major impediments to conducting
doing business in Korea were: foreign exchange risk; difficulty in dealing with the
bureaucracy; and problems in obtaining information from government and regulatory
bodies. Other major impediments included chaebol dominance of the domestic
market, Korea’s strong nationalism, Korean business culture and corruption. Despite
these negatives, 75 per cent of surveyed companies would encourage other Australian
companies to invest in Korea.

Table 8 Survey of why Australian companies wish to invest in Korea
Description of motives behind the initial
decision to invest
Already a major market and local presence
important
Part of company’s globalisation strategy
Explore a new market
Establish a beachhead for market expansion
Approached by Korea partner
Produce products for export to third market
Increase productivity by using low cost labour
Acquire local technology

Major reason (number
of responses)
16
9
4
3
1
0
0
0

Per cent
66
38
16
12
4
0
0
0

Note: Companies were given the opportunity to provide more than one motive behind their initial
decision to invest in Korea. Thus, responses add to more than 24 and percentages to more than 100.

Source: Lee (1998)
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Korean FDI in Australia
Korean data indicates that Korean FDI in Australia grew strongly from a low base of
about US$52 million in 1996 to US$100 million by the end of the 1990s. While such
FDI was diversified into many sectors it was mainly aimed at securing a stable supply
of energy and natural resources (Kwon and Oh (2001)). Half of it was concentrated in
coal mining, then forestry and fishery (see Figure 2).
Most mining investment is in production sharing joint ventures, but a few wholly
owned subsidiaries also operate. Many large Korean corporations in mining-related
business, including Samsung, SK, POSCO and KEPCO, have invested in Australia,
producing coal for their parent companies in Korea.
Korea’s major general trading companies have also established wholly owned
subsidiaries or representative offices in Australia. They import Korean merchandise
such as chemical products, steel products, heavy machinery and semiconductors into
Australia, and export goods including coal, iron ore, gold, non-ferrous metals and
wool from Australia. Other trading companies, mostly chaebol subsidiaries, import
Korean cars, household white goods and home electronics for wholesale or retail
distribution in Australia.
Although investment in the Australian manufacturing sector is still small, it is
expanding and diversifying into new products with some major investments in wool
and leather processing and chemical products. Other sectors include construction and
real estate investments. While these are relatively new areas for Korean overseas
direct investment, such investment is expected to increase substantially in the future
(Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999b)).

4.

Trade and investment prospects and opportunities

From an Australian perspective, Korea’s period of economic reform in the wake of
the financial crisis has created many new export and investment opportunities, as
trade is liberalised and FDI in Korea expands. In addition, improved financial and
corporate sector accountability, transparency and the improving regulatory
environment make it easier for Australian firms to do business. Market opportunities
for Australian firms are opening in technology dependent sectors, such as automotive
components, finance and banking, but also in bulk commodity sectors. Since the
crisis, with a view to cutting costs, Korean importers have reviewed supply
arrangements with traditional suppliers in the USA and Europe. As competition in the
Korean marketplace has increased, price and quality rather than traditional
relationships will increasingly determine input sourcing. This presents a good
opportunity for Australian companies.
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Figure 2 Sectoral distribution of Korean FDI in Australia (cumulative, 1968-98,
per cent)

Forestry
2%
Manufacturing
8%

Construction
2%
Others
10%

Trading
29%

Mining
49%

Note: Based on actual investments

Source: Korean Ministry of Finance and Economy (1998)
The following sectors provide excellent trade opportunities for Australian exporters in
the post crisis recovery of the Korean economy:
•

•

Industrial raw materials (energy, raw materials and intermediate inputs).
Australian companies meet many Korean import needs for raw materials and
basic foodstuffs. Australia's traditional trade in energy resources with Korea,
worth A$6 billion, is set to grow as Korea's demand for energy rises. Coal is a
critical requirement for Korean industry and LNG is the next strategic fuel for
Korea's economic growth. In both energy resources, Australia is a major world
player and has the capacity and experience to be a reliable supplier to meet
South Korean energy needs. South Korea's National Energy Plan, which sets
out the country's energy policies and requirements until 2011, projects an
increase in demand for LNG of 4.8 per cent annually. Australia is in a good
position to be able to meet Korea's energy demands well into the future. In
January 2003, Australia won a contract to supply South Korea with more than
3 million tons of LNG over seven years. The contract, worth about A$1
billion, is indicative of the confidence Korea has in Australia's long record as a
reliable, stable and competitive supplier of South Korea's energy needs.
Processed food and beverages. As the Korean economy continues its
economic growth demand for beef, especially with full liberalisation, will rise,
as with dairy products, wine and beer, seafoods and other western foods. Since
August 2002, Australia has successfully exported approximately 3,900 live
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•

•

•

•

•

cattle to Korea in 5 consignments between August 2002 and December 2003.
The cattle are prepared in accordance with South Korean import conditions
and are being released to local farmers following the mandatory post arrival
quarantine period.
Automotive components. Over the longer term the automotive sector presents
many mutually beneficial trade opportunities. Despite Korea’s considerable
automotive manufacturing capacity, its component sector is relatively weak
technologically. The development of an independent automotive technological
capacity remains a high priority and Korean firms are seeking strategic
technological alliances with other countries, including Australia (Austrade,
1999).
Information technology and other high technology products and services.
Australian suppliers of software applications for the banking and financial
services sector could face significant opportunities. Korea’s reform and
modernisation of its banking system has required a major upgrade of its
information technology infrastructure. Australian companies are well placed to
take advantage of emerging financial sector IT opportunities, particularly
where Australian IT firms have developed leading edge technology in market
segments. However, Australia needs to market aggressively these advantages
to attract Korean customers who may not be aware that Australia is a major
source of financial and professional services. A study commissioned by the
Australia-Korea Foundation in 2001, Australia-Korea: Strengthened
Economic Partnership, showed that there are emerging new fields for
strengthening the economic relationship, particularly in public infrastructure
development, IT broadband access and technology-based services. South
Korea has the highest rate of broadband uptake in the world, with
approximately sixty per cent of households using the technology. However
while South Korea leads the world in terms of infrastructure roll-out,
Australia's expertise in the development of broadband applications would be
of great benefit to Korea in its effort to stimulate market demand in industry
sectors. In May 2003, a Broadband Summit was held in Australia bringing
together industry leaders from both countries to explore collaboration in
information technology and broadband applications.
Building materials. Opportunities exist in detached residential housing,
building materials, project management services, building and urban
development services, waste management services and the supply of kit
homes.
Environmental services. Australian environmental engineering companies
have experience in industrial waste-water treatment in Korea. Water supply
and other urban infrastructure projects with strong environmental components
are likely to form part of employment creation and macroeconomic stimulus
public works projects. In the medium to long term, Korea is likely to increase
funding for environmental improvement projects.
Medical equipment and biotechnology. Since the economic crisis traditional
supply channels have forced Korean hospitals to re-assess their purchasing
decisions. US products are now more expensive, so alternatives need to be
sought. Australian suppliers need to cultivate relationships with purchasing
departments of hospitals, distributors and agents, and demonstrate the quality
and capacity of Australian products (Austrade, 1999).
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•

•

Distribution. In the wake of the financial crisis a new distribution environment
is appearing in Korea. Australian exporters have opportunities to supply new
multinational retailers by stressing Australian goods as being high quality and
value for money products.
Tourism and education. Tourism and education remain important elements of
the bilateral services trade. The South Korean student market is Australia's
third largest, and more than 207,300 South Korean tourists visited Australia in
2003.

From Korea’s perspective the Australian market has many potential trade and
investment opportunities. Australia has, for a number of years, been one of the fastest
growing OECD economies. Rising incomes and wealth have created a market with
considerable opportunities for Korea companies, particularly in terms of
telecommunications equipment, passenger motor vehicles, televisions and computers.
Australians have a reputation for being willing to try new high tech products that enter
the market. Being able to compete in the Australian market on an equal footing with
more expensive Japanese and US products is therefore crucial for Korean companies.
The prospect of a free trade agreement between Australia and the US could put
Korean companies at a competitive disadvantage.

5.

Prospects for a Korea-Australia FTA

As discussed, there are many potential opportunities for expanding trade and
investment flows between the two economies for mutual benefit. The numerous
obvious complementarities between these economies, and their relatively small
contribution to each other’s total imports, suggests that they are potentially ideal
partners for a free trade agreement. This section explores the prospects for the
establishment of a Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA) and the
prospective obstacles to its attainment.
Key factors behind a successful FTA
When Australian Prime Minister John Howard visited Korea in May 2000, he
proposed to the then Korean President Kim Dae-jung that the two countries form a
free trade agreement to further expand bilateral trade and investment ties (Korean
Herald, 20 May 2000). The success of a bilateral free trade agreement depends on the
economic size, economic systems, willingness and commitment of the countries
involved, existing trade barriers, and complementarities and competition between the
two economies (Kwon (2001)). The Australian and Korean economies are of
comparable size and hence the benefits of an FTA should not be skewed to either one
of these economies. Both economies should also be compatible for an FTA as they
have engaged in extensive reform of their economies involving deregulation and
liberalisation, and both have pursued outward-looking economic policies. Both
countries have also been strong supporters of the multilateral trading system and its
objectives. However, tariff and non-tariff barriers remain high between the two
countries.
Bilateral trade between Australia and Korea accounts for a small portion of their
respective world trade. Bilateral trade between the two countries accounted for about
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2.8 per cent of Korea’s total trade during the period of the 1990s. During the same
decade the amount of bilateral trade with Korea accounted for about 5.5 per cent of
Australia’s world trade. Both Korea and Australia depend heavily on the rest of the
world, and hence they should organise a non-discriminatory, open free trade
agreement.
Korean motivations and concerns from a KAFTA
A number of potential benefits arising from the establishment of a KAFTA can be
identified for Korea. First, it would enable Korea to overcome Australian tariff and
non-tariff barriers that have been problematic for some Korean exports, and secure
their access to the Australian market. Although the average tariff rate for Australia is
5 per cent, major exported goods from Korea face higher tariff rates. For example,
Australia has tariff rates of 20 per cent for automobiles and parts, and 20-30 per cent
tariff rates for textiles, clothing and footwear (Cheong (1999)). Australia has
increased its use of trade remedy laws such as anti-dumping and countervailing duties
to restrict foreign imports, and there is no guarantee that it would not expand their use
more often on Korean goods (Kwon (2001)).
Second, a KAFTA would enable Korean firms secure access to Australia’s abundant
natural resources and agricultural products. Given the current structure of its
economy, Korea is heavily dependent on foreign mineral and energy resources. It
would, therefore, be interested in securing access to Australian mineral resources not
only through freer trade but also through investment opportunities. In addition, some
agricultural products such as cotton, wool and sugar are used as intermediate goods
for Korea’s manufacturing sector. A KAFTA would also secure Korean access to
these inputs.
Finally, a KAFTA could encourage Australian FDI. As noted previously, two-way
FDI has remained at low levels. Australian investment in Korea accounts for a very
small proportion of Australian global FDI. One important reason for this is the fact
that there are few areas in which Australian firms have a comparative advantage in
Korea. A KAFTA, however, would open up the Korean services sector and provide
significant advantage for Australian companies, providing them with an incentive to
invest in the Korean services sector.
The key area of concern for Korea, and the major obstacle to the establishment of a
KAFTA, is Korea’s agricultural sector3. A KAFTA will require significant
improvements in efficiency and major restructuring of the agricultural sector. Most
Australian agricultural exports to Korea, with the exception of items such as beef and
live animals, complement Korean agriculture in the sense that some are not produced
in Korea, while others (fruit, beverages and horticultural products) are produced in
different seasons. Nevertheless, potentially adverse effects arising from a KAFTA
would produce considerable resistance to it from the politically strong agricultural
sector in Korea. In 2000 Korea imported US$8.1 billion of agricultural products
compared to production of US$20 billion by the domestic agriculture sector.
Agricultural imports from Australia amounted to US$706 million, thereby accounting
for 8.7 per cent of total agricultural exports in 2000, and making it the third largest
3

The author is grateful to an anonymous referee in emphasising this point.
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source of agriculture imports after China (with a market share of 21 per cent) and the
US (with a market share of 19.5 per cent) in 2000. From a Korean perspective this
large share of imports from Australia indicates the concern that Korea would have
from opening up its agriculture sector through a KAFTA. In addition, once it is open
to Australia, it would be difficult to restrict agricultural imports from other countries.
Under the rules of the WTO the establishment of an FTA means that members of the
FTA cannot raise barriers to trade against non-members, and should be open for
additional membership. Under these conditions Korea would have to confront serious
difficulties with regard to the agricultural sector from the establishment of an FTA
with Australia. This difficulty goes a substantial way in explaining why neither
Australia nor Korea have been pushing hard for a KAFTA.
Australian motivations and concerns from a KAFTA
The establishment of a KAFTA would be of interest to Australia for a number of
reasons. First, it would secure access to the Korean market for its traditional export
products and provide opportunities for the expansion of other goods and services
exports. After the financial crisis Korea engaged in an import liberalisation policy, but
despite this Korean tariffs have remained relatively high. The average tariff rate on
Australian goods was 9.1 per cent as of 1998, although its average tariff rate declined
to 8.3 per cent by 2004 under its commitment to the WTO. While tariffs on imports of
mineral products have been low, 3.6 per cent in 1998, Korean tariffs on agricultural
and food products, which are of primary importance to Australia, ranged from 11.3
per cent on fats and oils to 19.8 per cent on prepared food. Korea continues to use
adjustment duties to limit disruptions to domestic markets from imports, and the rates
of these adjustment duties can be higher or lower than those shown in the tariff
schedule. Korea still imposes non-tariff barriers, particularly on commodities that are
of interest to Australia. For example quarantine restrictions and customs related
impediments, particularly for horticulture, animal and dairy products.
Second, Korea could be used as a base by Australian firms to break into markets in
Northeast Asia and other East Asian countries (Australian Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (1999a)). The possible establishment of ASEAN+3 (China, Japan
and Korea), with Australia excluded, and Korea’s movement towards the
establishment of free trade agreements with a number of countries, would make a
KAFTA a useful means for Australia to achieve closer economic relations with other
East Asian countries that might otherwise be unattainable.
Third, Australia would be concerned with the potential for trade diversion of products
in which Australia has a comparative advantage should Korea negotiate other
successful FTAs. For example, an FTA with the US could displace Australia
agricultural and mineral products by US equivalents in the Korean market. Should a
Korea-Japan free trade agreement eventuate Australia would also be in danger of
losing to Japan the Korean market for its manufactured goods such as automobile
engines.
Fourth, the Korean services market offers considerable potential for Australia, since
the country has a comparative advantage in such services. Korea’s services sector has
been liberalising as a result of Korea’s Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994 and
accession to the OECD in 1996. Additional liberalisation of its services sector took
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place after the 1997 financial crisis as a way of increasing efficiency and attracting
more FDI. As a result, with the exception of a few wholly restricted and partially
restricted categories related to national security, culture and primary producers’
special position, most services businesses, including transport, communications,
finance, insurance and business services, are now open to FDI and competition. A
KAFTA would facilitate the expansion of Australian services to Korea in a number of
these areas.

6. Review of the economic effects from a KAFTA
The net gains from an FTA depend on whether the agreement generates trade creation
effects that improve welfare, or generates trade diversion effects that lower welfare.
Trade creation occurs when member country X imports from member country Y a
product that was sourced locally in country X before the establishment of the FTA.
This would occur if the protection structure in country X before the FTA raised the
price of imports above the domestic production price, making it previously cheaper to
source the product locally. Welfare will increase since country X now imports the
good from a lower cost source. On the other hand, trade diversion occurs when the
FTA causes member country X to import a product from member country Y that it
previously had imported from a lower cost non-member country. The FTA causes the
country to import from a higher cost supplier, thus decreasing welfare. The more
divergent the patterns of comparative advantage across member are, the greater is the
presumption that there exists room for trade creation with the formation of an FTA.
Alternatively, similar patterns of comparative advantage across member countries
implies that there is a greater possibility of trade diversion.
Studies on the benefit of a KAFTA
In the literature, apart from the studies by Cheong (1999) and Kim and Cheong
(1996), no quantitative assessments have been conducted measuring the impact of an
FTA between Australia and Korea. According to the study conducted by Kim and
Cheong (1996) a KAFTA would have increased Korean and Australian GDP in 1992
by 0.76 per cent and 0.72 per cent, respectively, through the elimination of tariffs
between the two countries. However, Korea’s total exports to Australia amounted to
only US$1.1 billion in 1992, or about 0.3 per cent of Korea’s GDP. Consequently, the
relatively tiny share of exports to Australia suggests that the extent of the benefit
estimated by Kim and Cheong (1996) is questionable. According to Cheong (1999),
based upon the quantitative results obtained in the Kim and Cheong (1996) study, in
1992 Australian exports to Korea would have increased by US$3.4 billion, or 109.7
per cent of Australia’s total exports to Korea valued at US$3.1 billion in that year, and
Korea’s exports to Australia would have increased by US$1.6 billion, or 145.5 per
cent of Korea’s total exports to Australia of US$1.1 billion in that year. These
estimates of the impact of a KAFTA on bilateral trade appear to be unrealistically
large (see Kwon (2001)).
While the study of Kim and Cheong (1996) produced highly aggregated estimates of
KAFTA’s economic effects, Kwon (2001) adopted a sectoral level approach to
identify if significant trade creation effects exist between Korea and Australia. In
doing so he uses the concept of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) (see Balassa
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(1965)). RCA calculations are used to analyse trade complementarity and competition
between two countries, which, in this case, can be applied to identify possible effects
of a KAFTA for both Australia and Korea. While the RCA technique does not
provide a complete analysis of bilateral trade creation and trade diversion, it does
provide a relatively disaggregated look at sectors that are likely to generate significant
impacts under a KAFTA.
Using the RCA technique two indices can be calculated. First, the revealed
comparative advantage of exports (RCAX) is represented by a country’s commodity
composition of exports relative to the commodity composition of world exports.
The RCAX index is defined as:
RCAXkj = (Xkj/Xkt) )(Xwj/Xwt) = (Xkj/Xwj) ) (Xkt/Xwt)
Where:
Xkj represents the value of country k’s exports of commodity j
Xkt represents the value of country k’s total exports
Xwj represents the value of world exports of commodity j
Xwt represents the value of total world exports of all commodities.
If the index exceeds unity then the country has a revealed comparative advantage in
commodity j. Similarly, if the index has a value less than unity then this implies that
the country does not have a revealed comparative advantage in commodity j.
A revealed comparative advantage of imports (RCAM) index, representing a
country’s import composition relative to the world total, can be defined as:
RCAMkj = (Mkj/Mkt) )(Mwj/Mwt) = (Mkj/Mwj) ) (Mkt/Mwt)
Where:
Mkj represents the value of country k’s imports of commodity j
Mkt represents the value of country k’s total imports
Mwj represents the value of world imports of commodity j
Mwt represents the value of total world imports of all commodities
An RCAM value of greater than unity implies that country k has a revealed
comparative advantage in its importation of commodity j, or a revealed comparative
disadvantage in commodity j. Where the RCAM value is less than unity, the country
would be said to not have a revealed comparative advantage in importing that product.
Kwon (2001) then uses RCA to determine whether bilateral trade between Australia
and Korea is complementary or competing on a cross sectional basis. He then uses
these results to assess whether a KAFTA is likely to lead to bilateral trade creation.
RCAX and RCAM indices are calculated for all products at the three digit SITC level
for the years 1995 and 1998 for both Australia and Korea. Calculations of RCAX and
RCAM presented are limited to those products for which values of exports and
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imports are reported for Australia, Korea and the World. The following case results
are presented:
Case 1 Complementarities between Australian exports (RCAXaus >1) and Korean
imports (RCAMkor > 1)
Case 2 Complementarities between Korean exports (RCAXkor > 1) and Australian
imports (RCAMaus > 1)
Case 3 Product categories where Australian (RCAXaus > 1) and Korea exports
RCAXkor > 1) compete
Case 4 Sectors in which Australia has a comparative advantage in both exports
(RCAXaus > 1) and imports (RCAMaus > 1)
Case 5 Sectors in which Korea has a comparative advantage in both exports
(RCAXkor > 1) and imports (RCAMkor > 1)
The results for Case 1 are presented in Table 9. This shows the product categories in
which Australia’s export specialisation (RCAXaus larger than unity) match Korea’s
import specialisation (RCAMkor larger than unity). Seventeen product categories,
representing 39.2 per cent of Australia’s total exports in 1998, are complementary
with Korean imports. Major sectors of complementarity of Australian exports, which
account for a significant share (more than 1 per cent) of total Australian exports,
include, not surprisingly, raw agricultural products (wheat and cotton), and mineral
products (iron ore, base metal ores, coal and petroleum products).
The results for Case 2 are presented in Table 10. This shows the product categories in
which Korea’s export specialisation (RCAXkor larger than unity) match Australia’s
import specialisation (RCAMaus larger than unity). Major sectors of complementarity
of Korean exports, which account for a significant share (more than 1 per cent) of
total Korea exports, include some chemical products (polymerisation products), some
basic manufactures (rubber tyres, man made fibre fabric), and machines and
transportation equipment (automatic data equipment, telecommunications equipment,
household equipment, transistors, passenger motor vehicles and ships and boats etc.).
For the case of Korea, 37.3 per cent of its total exports are complementary with
Australian imports.
The results for Case 3 are shown in Table 11, which shows the extent of competition
between Australian and Korean exports in world markets. These are the product
categories in which both Australia and Korea have RCAX indices higher than unity.
These reflect intra-industry trade, where Australia and Korea export the same
products in significant quantities to the world market, including each other’s markets.
There are only a few product categories in which Australia and Korea are competing
in world markets. They are petroleum products, leather, iron and steel in primary
forms, copper products, and ships and boats, representing 12.2 per cent and 4.7 per
cent respectively, of Korean and Australian total exports in 1998. This finding
indicates that the two economies are in competition with each other in the world
market only for a very limited number of products.
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Case 4 results are shown in Table 12. This shows the extent of domestic intra industry
trade within an economy. This type of domestic intra industry trade is reflected in a
country exporting a product as well as importing that same product in significant
quantities. Significant intra industry specialisation will yield high RCAX and RCAM
indices for the same product categories of a country. There are only three product
categories in which Australia has RCAX and RCAM both larger than unity. They are
copper products, ships and boats and photo cinema supplies. Exports of these products
amounted to 2.4 per cent of total Australian exports in 1998. This reflects the simple
industrial and trade structures of the Australian economy, which exports mainly
agricultural and mineral products and imports mainly manufactured products.
Case 5 results are shown in Table 13. This indicates that Korea has more extensive
domestic intra industry trade. RCAX and RCMX are larger than unity for 17 product
categories. These are refined petroleum products, some chemical products, some basic
manufactures, and some machinery and transport equipment, representing 40.2 per
cent of total Korean exports in 1998. This indicates that Korean industrial and trade
structures are more diversified than in the Australian economy, suggesting that in the
non traditional trading industries Korea may be more likely to take advantage of trade
liberalisation from a KAFTA as compared to Australia.
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Table 9 Case 1 Complementarity between Australian Exports and Korean
Imports
Australian
(RCAXaus
SITC
041
081
211

222

263
281
287

288

322
334

533
611
672

682
684
793
882

Commodity
Wheat etc.
unmilled
Animal
feedstuff
Hides,
skins,
(excluding
furskins),
raw
Oil
seeds
for
‘soft’
fixed
vegetable
oils
Cotton
Iron ore &
concentrates
Ores
and
concentrates
of
base
metal, nes
Non ferrous
scrap metal,
nes
Coal lignite
and peat
Petroleum
products,
refined
Pigments,
paints etc.
Leather
Iron, steel
primary
forms
Copper
Aluminium
Ships and
boats etc.
Photo,
cinema
supplies

Exports
> 1)

Korean
(RCAMkor

Imports
> 1)

1995
7.176

1998
14.590

1995
0.990

1998
2.383

Share
of
Aus. total
exports (%)
1998
3.95

1.404

1.506

0.947

1.281

0.59

5.626

6.507

6.010

7.008

0.57

0.591

1.748

1.362

1.723

0.46

4.308
24.831

9.106
24.157

2.513
2.635

2.829
3.825

1.76
4.48

14.878

19.260

1.536

2.989

6.54

1.669

1.500

1.607

1.287

0.22

26.448

30.651

3.467

5.816

11.04

1.054

1.036

1.624

0.170

1.78

1.421

1.342

0.999

1.047

0.54

2.157
1.958

1.930
1.929

1.400
3.065

1.215
1.278

0.51
0.88

1.857
4.307
0.738

1.238
4.719
1.229

1.896
1.719
3.623

2.694
1.680
1.241

0.65
3.82
0.95

1.389

1.424

1.195

1.513

0.45

Source: Kwon (2001) based on calculations from the UN International Trade
Statistics Yearbook (1999).
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Table 10 Case 2 Complementarity between Korean Exports and Australian
Imports
Korean
(RCAXkor

SITC
513
582

583
625
653
658
678
682
723
724
752

761
762
763
764
775
778
781
793
831
845
898
899

Commodity
Carboxylic
acids
etc.
Plates, sheets, film,
foil and strip, of
plastics
Polymerisation etc.
products
Rubber tyres, inner
tubes etc.
Woven man made
fibre fabrics
Textile articles nes
Wire of iron or steel
Copper
Civil
engineering
equipment etc.
Textile,
leather
machinery
Automatic
data
processing
equipment
Television receivers
Radio
broadcast
receivers
Sound
recorders,
phonographs
Telecommunications
equipment nes
Household
type
equipment nes
Electrical machinery
nes
Passenger
motor
vehicles
Ships and boats etc.
Travel goods and
handbags
Textile
fabric
apparel
Musical instruments
Other manufactured
goods

Exports
> 1)

Australian
(RCAMaus

Imports
> 1)

1995
1.625

1998
1.884

1995
0.953

1998
na

Share of
Korean
total
exports
(%)
1998
0.53

1.758

1.694

1.082

0.006

0.91

na

2.095

0.742

na

2.79

na

2.483

1.863

na

1.17

7.999

6.477

0.937

1.016

3.49

1.224
1.023
0.499
1.136

0.830
1.112
1.705
0.941

1.389
1.094
0.529
2.656

0.964
0.556
1.155
0.860

0.23
0.56
0.90
0.49

1.242

1.018

0.777

2.637

0.38

1.274

1.158

1.553

0.119

3.43

3.416
1.626

1.949
0.569

1.172
1.088

0.392
10.634

0.86
0.18

3.429

2.108

1.132

1.178

0.80

1.438

1.251

1.335

0.197

3.44

2.035

1.972

1.312

0.699

1.30

2.846

0.619

1.220

0.209

0.90

1.242

1.248

1.168

0.120

6.50

6.050
1.874

7.869
0.998

2.736
1.308

0.453
1.093

6.06
0.27

1.508

1.238

0.609

2.685

0.97

1.876
1.371

1.256
0.967

1.893
1.317

1.201
2.678

0.73
0.36

Source: Kwon (2001) based on calculations from the UN International Trade
Statistics Yearbook (1999).
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Table 11 Case 3 Product categories in which Australian and Korean exports
compete

SITC
334

611
672

682
793

Commodity
Petroleum
products,
refined
Leather
Iron
and
steel
primary
forms
Copper
Ships and
boats etc.

Australian
(RCAXaus

Exports
> 1)

Korean
(RCAXkor

Exports
> 1)

Share of
Aus. total
exports
(%)

1995
1.054

1998
1.036

1995
1.009

1998
1.921

1998
1.78

Share
of
Korean
total
exports
(%)
1998
3.29

2.157
1.958

1.930
1.929

4.053
1.746

3.326
2.420

0.51
0.88

0.88
1.11

1.857
0.738

1.238
1.229

0.499
6.050

1.705
7.869

0.65
0.95

0.90
6.06

Source: Kwon (2001) based on calculations from the UN International Trade
Statistics Yearbook (1999).

Table 12 Case 4 Sectors in which Australia has a comparative advantage in both
exports and imports

SITC
682
793
882

Commodity
Copper
Ships and
boats etc.
Photo,
cinema
supplies

Australian
(RCAXaus

Exports
> 1)

Australian
(RCAMaus

Imports
> 1)

1995
1.857
0.738

1998
1.238
1.229

1995
0.529
0.529

1998
1.115
1.115

Share of
Aus. total
exports
(%)
1998
0.65
0.65

1.389

1.424

1.771

1.090

0.45

Source: Kwon (2001) based on calculations from the UN International Trade
Statistics Yearbook
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Table 13 Case 5 Sectors in which Korea has a comparative advantage in both
Exports and Imports

SITC
334
511
513
582

611
651
653
654
672
673

674
682
724
776
778
793
871

Commodity
Petroleum products,
refined
Hydrocarbons nes,
derivatives
Carboxylic
acids
etc.
Plates, sheets, film,
foil and strip, of
plastics
Leather
Textile yarn
Woven man made
fibre fabrics
Other woven textile
fabrics
Iron, steel primary
forms
Flat rolled products
of iron or non-alloy
steel
Iron, steel universal
plate sheet
Copper
Textile,
leather
machinery
Transistors, valves
etc.
Electrical machinery
nes
Ships and boats etc.
Optical instruments

Korean
(RCAXkor

Exports
> 1)

Korean
(RCAMkor

Imports
> 1)

1995
1.009

1998
1.921

1995
1.624

1998
0.170

Share of
Korean
total
exports
(%)
1998
3.29

2.312

3.489

3.109

3.109

0.98

1.625

1.884

0.953

1.758

1.694

1.202

1.260

0.91

4.053
1.584
7.999

3.326
4.053
6.477

1.400
1.866
0.937

1.215
1.775
1.016

0.88
1.176
3.49

1.621

1.404

1.841

1.617

0.25

1.746

2.420

3.065

1.278

1.11

0.845

1.709

1.278

0.593

0.77

1.875

2.860

1.050

0.829

2.74

0.499
1.242

1.705
1.018

1.896
1.775

2.694
0.763

0.90
0.38

4.295

40.720

2.051

3.824

14.674

2.846

0.619

0.797

1.030

0.90

6.050
1.256

7.869
4.658

3.623
2.140

1.241
2.999

6.06
1.13

0.53

Source: Kwon (2001) based on calculations from the UN International Trade
Statistics Yearbook (1999).

7. Summary and policy implications of a KAFTA
The Australian and Korean economies are highly complementary for numerous
products, and are in direct competition for only a limited number of products. For
Australia, 39.2 per cent of its exports are complementary with Korea, and only 4.7 per
cent of its exports are in competition with Korea. In the case of Korea, 37.3 per cent
of its exports are complementary with Australia, while 12.2 per cent of them are in
competition with Australia. Hence, based on the current economic and trading
structures of each economy, there are large potential opportunities for inter-industry
trade creation from the formation of a KAFTA. However, as both economies face
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changing structures towards knowledge based economies there could be even further
inter industry opportunities for expanded trade in the future. In the new knowledge
based economies of Korea and Australia the former is likely to specialise in
knowledge based manufacturing activities, while Australia is likely to specialise in
knowledge based service activities.
Despite apparently high levels of complementarity and low levels of competition
between the two economies, a KAFTA should not be considered as a substitute for
multilateral trade liberalisation by the two countries. Bilateral trade between the two
accounts for only a small proportion of their respective world trade, indicating that
both are heavily dependent upon the rest of the world. Therefore, both should
continue to pursue a multilateral trade liberalisation agenda within the context of the
WTO. The low extent of competition is also not necessarily desirable in conjunction
with the formation of a KAFTA, as it may indicate few opportunities for intraindustry trade creation. The existing industrial and trade structures of the two
economies has contributed to underdeveloped intra-industry trade between them,
particularly in the manufacturing and high technology areas, suggesting that the
establishment of a KAFTA would have limited potential for intra-industry trade
expansion. In particular, the Australian industrial structure is not sufficiently
diversified to take full advantage of opportunities arising in the knowledge-based
sectors. However, such trade could become more important in the future as
restructuring moves these economies towards their objective of becoming more
knowledge based.
Another benefit from the establishment of a KAFTA is an increase in inflows of FDI.
Since both economies are relatively small a KAFTA is unlikely to attract significant
amounts of FDI to establish production bases within them. However, with both
Australia and Korea attempting to establish other regional free trade agreements with
neighbouring countries, a KAFTA region could become part of a larger regional trade
bloc. This could attract FDI into the region to develop raw materials in Australia or to
develop a foothold in a broad Northeast Asian economic region.
Another advantage of a KAFTA for both countries is that it could provide a useful
experiment about the benefits arising from the formation of an FTA. As the
economies are similar in size and their bilateral trade accounts for a small proportion
of their respective world trade, disruption from the formation of a KAFTA on their
respective economies may not be high. Since the objective of a KAFTA is to reduce
trade and investment barriers between the two countries, it sets out a schedule for
lowering trade barriers that might not otherwise occur and thereby facilitate the
formation of other regional trade agreements. For Korea, in particular, the formation
of KAFTA will help to improve its international competitiveness and facilitate
domestic structural reforms, which is likely to make Korea more attractive to foreign
investment.
Despite all the potential gains from the establishment of a KAFTA a major stumbling
block remains - the Korean agricultural sector (Kwon (2001b). The sector faces
serious structural problems. Suitable land for cultivation is insufficient to meet the
production needs of domestic agricultural demand, and the shortage of land in
comparison with the agricultural population has resulted in small-scale farming that
has been the main cause of low agricultural productivity and low incomes for farm
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households. Low farm income has in turn accelerated the migration of young farmers
to urban areas. The remaining ageing farmers are reluctant to mechanise agriculture
and to introduce innovations, thereby further slowing productivity and income
growth. These structural problems have contributed to the continual decline of the
sector, to only 4.6 per cent of GDP and 10.9 per cent of total employment in 2000.
Despite this decline in the economic importance of the sector, it still exerts
considerable political and cultural influence. As a result the government has attempted
to maintain the viability of the agricultural sector and the rural communities that it
supports, as well as alleviating and preventing further social problems in urban areas
arising from internal migration. Finally, Korean agriculture is characterised not only
by small-scale farms but also by rice oriented farming systems. As the staple food in
Korea rice remains the dominant crop in terms of production, land use and
government support. Livestock products, fruits and vegetables are, however, growing
in importance. Secure provision of staples, in particular rice, from domestic sources is
regarded as important for national security. Under these circumstances it is difficult to
envisage that Korea will agree to a KAFTA at the present time, and this goes some
way to explaining why discussions relating to a FTA between the two countries is not
currently on the agenda of either.
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